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1. Introduction 
In Canada as well as in other countries, many of the concerns about the appropriateness of the 
technological basis of economic production are being expressed in terms of problems of 
competitiveness, sustainability, and innovation. Science and technology policies and innovation 
management practices, in particular, are addressing the competitiveness and sustainability agendas 
from an innovation perspective.) 
Specialists have spilt much ink debating the meanings and implications of the notions of 
competitiveness and sustainability. Each notion often works as a metalanguage with its own set of 
assumptions, problems, and agenda of prescribed actions. The competitiveness and sustainability 
agendas share a sometimes apocalyptic language to describe the consequences of failure to attain 
competitiveness or sustainability. Both are frequently held up as imperatives which challenge systems 
of innovation at the deepest levels. 
The competitiveness and sustainability agendas do not frequently refer to each other, and in many 
respects they talk past or contradict each other. There are few overlaps or linkages between the 
sustainability and competitiveness' policy networks and interest groups. However, the two agendas 
1 In this text I use the terms "science policy," "science and technology policy," and "innovation policy" 
interchangeably. 
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are each increasingly sensitive to problems of technological innovation, and each hints at the necessity 
or the inevitability of a new "techno-economic paradigm" upon which the next century's peace and 
prosperity can be based. In one formulation that is strongly advocated by some technology policy 
advisory agencies, a strategic course of technological innovation provides the only way to reconcile 
the two conflicting goals of reducing levels of pollution and resource deterioration while achieving 
major, sustainable increases in economic activity. In other words, a particular course of action 
regarding technological innovation may provide an intersection between the competitiveness and 
sustainability agendas. 
This paper is meant to stimulate discussion about a social science research agenda on innovation, 
sustainability, and competitiveness in the North American region. I will try to be explicit about the 
paper's assumptions. First, I use the term "competitiveness" to refer to the ability to successfully 
offer products or services in an open trading system, in exchange for income, despite others who 
offer similar products or services, thus maintaining or expanding access to the life chances that 
income can purchase. Competitiveness is a frequently cited rationale and objective of innovation 
policy measures in Canada. I use the term "sustainability" to refer to development that does not pass 
on undue or irreversible environmental costs to succeeding generations. 1 The term "innovation" 
usually refers to the first commercial application of a product or process by a user.2 This definition of 
innovation is close to what is commonly understood as "technological progress" and it focuses 
attention on increases in efficiency and productivity. About one-third of U.S. economic growth 
between 1929 and 1982 can be attributed to innovation of this sort (Denison, 1985). 
A broader definition of innovation to address issues raised by the competitiveness and sustainability 
agendas is required because the larger the increment of technological change, the more likely 
organizational or social innovations are involved. Understanding innovation at the managerial, 
organizational, social, or cultural levels requires, at the very least, that a host of conceptual and 
measurement problems be addressed. 
Second, I claim that two of the most consistent (and increasingly explicit) policy agendas of our 
1 The issue of social sustainability cannot be so simply specified. Insofar as poverty breeds 
environmental degradation and environmental degradation breeds poverty, linkages between 
environmental and social sustainability are evident. However, high consumption - as currently practiced, 
at least - also breeds environmental degradation. In some cases of "traditional" societies with extensive 
knowledge of the natural environment, social and environmental sustainability are closely linked. 
2 In contrast, "invention" refers to the creation of originality or novelty. 
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times, the competitiveness and sustainability agendas, are committed to stimulating, guiding, or 
directing science and technology to achieve their ends. Each agenda attempts to influence 
technological and industrial innovation in the narrow sense and each ponders the broader issues of 
institutional and social innovation, raising a host of questions about ends and means. 
Third, innovation takes place in "systems" of public and private institutions and the rules and routines 
of their behavior. Innovation research uses notions such as "system of innovation" (Niosi et al. 1993; 
Nelson 1993) to describe the social institutions of innovation. 
The set of distinctions among minor and major forms of technological change employed by 
evolutionary economists helps to address the level-of-analysis problem that one encounters when 
searching for the boundaries of a system. Freeman (1992) distinguishes among innovation at the 
level of the firm, the production system, the technology system, and the technoeconomic paradigm. 
These distinctions identify progressively larger increments of change in current practices of 
production, and progressively broader groups of organizations and behaviors taken as reference 
points. Incremental innovations are minor cumulative changes continuously occurring in firms which 
can add up over time to significant improvements in productivity and efficiency. Radical innovations 
are discontinuities in the production system. Nylon and the oxygen steelmaking process are historical 
examples. More recently, radical innovations are usually the result of deliberate research and 
development in enterprises and/or in university and government laboratories" (Freeman 1992). 
Changes of "technology system" are the result of clusters of radical innovations that create "far- 
reaching changes in technology, affecting several branches of the economy, as well as ultimately 
giving rise to entirely new sectors." Synthetic materials and the associated manufacturing techniques 
are examples. Technological revolutions, or change of "technoeconomic paradigm," are new 
technology systems which have such pervasive effects on the economy as a whole that they change 
the style of production and management throughout the economy" (Freeman 1992). Technological 
innovation entails organizational, social, or cultural innovation. 
Fourth, I inquire whether it might be useful to develop and apply a "systems of innovation" approach 
in the North American region. The existence of a North American system of innovation may be 
surmised on the basis of the considerable degree of economic integration that has taken place among 
the United States, Mexico, and Canada. However, the contours and dynamics of this system have 
not been well described. 
Fifth, my discussion focuses primarily on problems of industrial innovation, and the section on 
sustainability is correspondingly limited. Issues of natural resource management, energy, 
transportation, sustainable cities, or sustainable agriculture need to be examined from an innovation 
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perspective, but it has not been possible to do it here. 
While neither competitiveness nor sustainability (however defined) is imaginable in the absence of 
innovation, the key issue, in my view, is the degree to which a production system can be both 
competitive and sustainable in a given context. As North American economic integration proceeds, 
science and technology policies and private management strategies will respond to the emerging 
conditions of innovation in the region. Subregional patterns of economic activity will change, and 
successful social mastery of new configurations of production will be an important skill to acquire. 
The greening of technology policies and management practices presents a new set of challenges in the 
context of trade regional liberalization, heightened infra- and inter-regional competition, and increased 
mobility in factors of production. 
2. A North American System of Innovation 
The notion of "system of innovation" can be operationalized in terms of financial flows, legal and 
policy links, and flows of information, science, technology, and people (Niosi et al. 1993). Among 
the legal and policy measures that are contributing to an integrated North American innovation system 
are the NAFTA rules governing investment, intellectual property, and technical standards. Among the 
financial and technology flows is the huge volume of bilateral trade between the United States and its 
two neighbors, especially intrafirm trade. Among the flows of science are the innumerable linkages 
between Canada and the U.S. on the one hand and the U.S. and Mexico on the other. The familiar 
"hub-and-spokes" pattern of North American economic interchange, in which the United States' 
neighbors entertain extensive interactions with it but very little with each other, is paralleled in patterns 
of scientific communication.) 
A regional system integrator is an actor that aligns and integrates the economic and technological 
systems of regional members in interaction with them, including bilateral and multilateral trade, direct 
investment, official development assistance, non market technological collaboration (for example, 
military), political relationships, provision of services, establishment of trade rules, export of 
production technology, and export of the "software" of technological development such as 
1 For example, co-authored U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico scientific publications accounted for about 
12% of Canadian scientific output and about 16% of Mexican output in 1990. However,'these 
publications only represent about 2% of American scientific output (Davis, Dufour and Halliwell 1993: 
277). Bilateral Canada-Mexico scientific publications and trilateral Mexico-Canada-U.S. publications 
are negligible. 
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management beliefs, social science paradigms, administrative and technical curricula, information, 
publications, symbolic reward systems, etc. (Yamashita 1991). These linkages help spread a pattern 
of growth into related economies. In Asia, the Japanese role of regional integrator may represent an 
enlargement of the parent-subcontract industrial relation" to include newly industrializing countries 
(Yamashita 1991, 4). In Europe the role of systems integrator is played by a supranational institution, 
the European Community, its multitude of programs and policies, and the networks of firms and 
institutions within the regional economic space. The United States, its large firms, and the regional 
trade rules are the principal innovation system integrators in North America. 
In contrast to trends in Asia and Europe, science, technology, and innovation have not been 
prominent considerations in the discussions about the North American region's future. Before the 
present decade, neither Canada, nor the United States, nor Mexico tended to see itself as a member of 
a North American "community" or "system." Most attention focused instead on the extensive bilateral 
relationships between Canada and the United States on the one hand, and between Mexico and the, 
U.S. on the other. It was implausible to suggest that North America might evolve into a region 
possessing a specific, shared identity and continental-scale institutions. 
Regional economic integration is reshaping the North American economic landscape. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) establishes a framework for a trade regime encompassing 
one of the largest (about 360 million people) and richest (about $6 trillion) regional markets in the 
world. NAFTA sets trade rules for a regional economy that has already undergone substantial 
integration. Canada and the United States have the world's largest bilateral trade relationship, and the 
United States is Mexico's largest trading partner. 
NAFTA includes provisions for the reduction and eventual elimination of most tariffs affecting 
commerce among Canada, the United States, and Mexico in commodities, manufactured goods, and 
services. However, NAFTA goes beyond tariff elimination to establish rules governing trade and 
investment. The three countries agree not to discriminate against each others' goods and services, and 
to eliminate most tariffs over a decade. Customs procedures and temporary entry for business 
travellers are simplified. Mexican import licensing procedures are immediately eliminated. 
The chapter on rules of origin sets out formulae by which Mexican, American, or Canadian products 
incorporating third-party materials or components can qualify for preferential access to each other's 
markets. Under the net cost formula, most products qualify for preferential treatment with 50% North 
American content. In the case of light vehicles, the figure is 62.5%. This provision is designed to 
discourage new transplants from using Mexico to supply the U.S. automotive market. The rules for 
determining North American content can be complex in practice, and their primary implication for 
manufacturing is in sourcing practices. 
NAFTA extends national treatment to member countries' suppliers of goods and services to public 
.markets. NAFTA signatories agree not to impose offsets or performance requirements in public 
procurement. Improved tendering and dispute resolution procedures are specified. The rules 
governing public procurement are broader than those in the GATT procurement code, and NAFTA, in 
its extension of procurement rules to subnational governments (states, provinces, and municipalities), 
goes well beyond the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The net result is to liberalize a North 
American public market of about $70 billion. 
NAFTA sets rules regarding control over foreign investments. It establishes the principle of national 
treatment for all three parties regarding investments, establishment of new businesses, acquisition and 
sale of businesses, and the conduct and operation of businesses. No minimum levels of equity may 
be imposed on purchases or ownership. No performance requirements (for import substitution, local 
sourcing, export targets, foreign exchange generation, production sharing, product mandates, hiring 
of nationals in management positions, or technology transfer) may be imposed on investments from 
any of the three countries or on any investments from any third country (Article 1106). However, 
governments may offer "advantages" to firms in exchange for commitments regarding R&D, training, 
expansion, or location of production facilities. Canada retains the investment screening regime 
established under CUFTA (the right to review direct acquisition of Canadian controlled firms valued 
at more than C$ 150 million). No restrictions may be placed on the patriation of profits and transfer 
payments. Mexico retains a range of investment prohibition privileges in the energy and 
communication sectors. 
Unlike CUFTA, NAFTA contains a chapter setting out rules for intellectual property. Chapter 17 
applies standards regarding sound recordings, literary and artistic works, software, data, designs, 
copyright, trademarks, and patents. It makes provisions for enforcing intellectual property rights, and 
it restrains the parties' latitude to permit compulsory licensing of patents. 
NAFTA also contains provisions governing energy, natural resources, agriculture, financial services, 
technical standards, telecommunications, cultural industries, and transportation services. Like the 
Agreement's provisions discussed above, the general thrust is to deregulate and liberalize trade in 
these industries within North America, and to specify special cases in which governments retain rights 
to discriminate. Two "side agreements" cover labor and, environmental issues. However, the 
disciplines envisaged by these two agreements in case of noncompliance are weak (Shrybman, 1993; 
Martin 1992). 
Continental market liberalization necessarily modifies the options available to policymakers to 
structure national or subnational economic development, and reduces the range of policy instruments 
available. Because NAFTA establishes new rules of the game for regional trade, it has been called an 
"economic constitution for North America." What are the implications of NAFTA for innovation 
policy and management? 
In the first place, NAFTA clearly restrains governments from imposing performance requirements on 
foreign investors, North American or other, and considerably reduces governments' latitude to screen 
foreign direct investment (FDI).1 Also, under NAFTA governments cannot impose performance 
requirements but may negotiate some kinds of innovation-related performances with firms in 
exchange for incentives. 
In the second place, like CUFTA, NAFTA contains no rules governing subsidies, one of the most 
difficult issues on the trade policy agenda. Many kinds of government assistance have been labelled 
subsidies in U.S.-Canada trade disputes, including grants, tax credits, low-interest loans, and 
unemployment insurance. The subsidy issue was not resolvable during CUFTA negotiations. In the 
case of NAFTA, the subsidy issue was referred to the GATT, where the recently signed Dunkel text 
contains rules governing publicly-supported R&D and other kinds of subsidies. Since NAFTA does 
not cover subsidies, the "rules of the game" are unclear regarding direct or indirect public involvement 
in initiatives that help create advantage in the private sector. Given the uncertainty about subsidies, 
policymakers in Canada and Mexico will probably pay close attention to innovation policy practices in 
the United States in the belief that American practices will set a de facto standard in the region. The 
Clinton administration has adopted a more vigorous approach to promotion of industrial innovation 
than the two preceding administrations. 
In the third place, NAFTA is clearly intended to cover the activities of subnational governments, 
insofar as the respective Federal governments are empowered to commit subnational governments 
through international agreements. This will have the same effects on state and provincial innovation 
policies as on national policies in North America. Many states and provinces have developed quite 
extensive programs and institutions in support of innovation. Similarly, many American cities offer 
substantial industrial incentives. Tax and subsidy competition among localities is widespread in 
North America. 
I The issue is not whether unencumbered inward and outward FDI confers important benefits. The issue 
is whether selective intervention to affect the terms of investments and takeovers in specific cases of 
strategic importance is warranted (Lipsey 1991). 
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European and North American regional trade arrangements shield regional economies from offshore 
competition. However, the two regional arrangements are based on quite divergent philosophies. 
Europe has adopted a "Keynesian" approach to regional economic integration, creating a wide range 
of institutional arrangements to address economic and social issues. European economic integration 
involves an attempt to build an administrative framework that takes into account the economic 
efficiency and collective security needs of the community, by means of the creation of a genuinely 
mixed economy at the regional level, when it seemed no longer viable on a national level" (Deblock 
and Rioux 1993: 32). 
In contrast, NAFTA, like the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement it superseded, largely concentrates 
on removing barriers to the movement of goods and capital. NAFTA is a "negative" approach to 
regional economic integration. It is concerned largely with removing tariff and nontariff barriers to 
movements of goods, services, and capital. It has no mechanisms to promote positive adjustment to 
economic integration. Problems of adjustment are largely left to the national governments to resolve. 
A regional trade agreement provides preferences among member countries, and fosters intraregional 
trade at the expense of interregional trade. Continental trade liberalization is precipitating wide 
discussion in North America about jobs, the environment, and national sovereignty. What are the 
implications of economic continental ization for science and technology strategies in the region, 
considering the increasingly integrated continental production system into which the two smaller 
countries have opted, and considering also the constraints placed by NAFTA on use of a wide range 
of traditional instruments of industrial and economic policy? 
The rationale for trade liberalization is well known. Manufacturing firms require economies of scale 
to compete in global markets, and production efficiencies are determined by relative size of market. 
Under tariff protection, inefficient, subcritical plants produce short runs of excessively diverse 
product lines. Access to a large market and increased competition should lead to rationalization and 
accelerated R&D investments (Daly and MacCharles 1986). Trade liberalization should induce 
manufacturers in Canada to rationalize within the North American market, decreasing unit costs and 
reducing the productivity gap with the United States (ECC, 1988). One expects increased competition 
to improve the technical and allocative efficiency of firms (Globerman 1990). Thus economic gains 
from trade liberalization are principally realizable in the presence of productivity growth via attainment 
of economies of scale, increased internal R&D investments, and a higher rate of technological 
diffusion within firms and their supplier networks. As for the reorganization of production in North 
America, the simplest assumption is that of segmented production, with resource extraction, mass 
assembly operations, and higher R&D and management functions all sited in different locations. 
In 
However, a much wider range of organizational responses is available to firms, such as just-in-time 
production (and its implications for proximity to suppliers), strategic alliances, multilocational 
production strategies, flexible specialization and the like (Eden 1991; 1994). Concern is being voiced 
that the North American trade regime provides strong incentives for manufacturers to respond to 
market competition with a low-wage strategy, which will lower incomes and productivity over the 
long run, rather than [take] the more difficult path of producing quality products more efficiently." 1 
This would create downward pressures on social and environmental standards in North America. 
While the objective pursued by conventional trade policy is to increase the "allocative" or "Ricardian" 
efficiency of the economy, the rationale of development-oriented innovation policy is to increase the 
"growth" or "Schumpeterian" efficiency of the economy (Dosi, Zysman, and Tyson 1990, 25).,,' A 
major task facing policymakers, practitioners, and innovation scholars in North America is to identify 
plausible routes to technological learning in open economies and assemble a collection of policy 
instruments that are relatively effective (i.e. likely to induce technological spillovers into the 
economy), efficient (i.e. do not entail disproportionately high costs), and acceptable under the 
prevailing trade regime. 
Industrial Innovation and Canadian Competitiveness 
Canada is a trading nation. Approximately 30% Canada's GDP is generated through international 
trade, and the combination of imports and exports amounts to half of Canada's GDP. Of the G-7 
countries, only in Germany does international trade contribute a higher proportion of GDP. Although 
much of the discussion about innovation in Canada has been pitched in terms of adjustment to 
"globalization," Canada's international trade is mainly continental. About three-quarters of Canadian 
trade is with the United States, and more than half of this is intra-firm trade. Furthermore, Canadian 
international trade is highly concentrated. About 70% takes place via about 50 firms, half of which 
are of Canadian origin. 
The search for competitiveness has created an eager market for indicators, yardsticks, and report cards 
in Canada. These provide sometimes paradoxical views on the state of Canadian competitiveness. 
According to the United Nations Human Development Index in 1992, Canadians enjoy the highest 
quality of life in the world. According to the OECD, Canada recently had the fastest increase in 
1 Faux and Lee (1992: 244); see also the discussion in Herzenberg (1993) and Eden (1994). 
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employment among the G-7 countries and the second highest growth rate. But the World 
Competitiveness Report's 1993 survey ranked Canada eleventh among twenty-two industrialized 
countries, down from fourth place just four years earlier. The World Competitiveness Report gave 
rely vely high marks to Canada's financial system (3d place) and infrastructure (5th place), but low 
marks to Canadian science and technology strategies (16th place), quality of production technologies 
(15th place), trade diversification (20th place), quality of management (14th place), and investment in 
new equipment (21st place). Of all countries surveyed, only Britain's manufacturing base had 
deteriorated more dramatically than Canada's. Canada has lost an estimated half million 
manufacturing jobs since 1989, with manufacturing's share of overall employment falling to about 
15%. The unemployment rate is about 11%, and by mid-1990s the net public debtJGDP ratio will 
have climbed to about 75% - up from about 30% at the beginning of the 1980s. Canada is carrying 
one of the highest per capita public debts among advanced countries. 
Canadian competitiveness has been dissected and debated in an avalanche of reports and studies.I 
Many believe that Canada's overall technological effort is too modest, and R&D expenditures too 
heavily dependent on the public sector, to help realize Canada's aspirations to maintain an advanced 
economy. To get to the bottom of the competitiveness question, in 1990 the Federal government and 
the Business Council on National Issues commissioned Harvard Business School strategist Michael 
Porter to apply his renowned "diamond" analysis to Canada. 
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) Porter says that a nation's goal is to improve the 
standard of living by increasing the growth of industry through increasing industrial productivity and 
through shifting resources to higher productivity segments. This will normally happen as industry 
works to reduce unit costs and differentiate products, but industry will not choose to do so unless 
faced with competition (rivalry) and opportunities for innovation in their markets. Nations are 
"competitive" if their firms can engineer not just cost improvements but also differentiation. 
International rivalry normally pushes firms down product streams toward highly differentiated 
products. This requires constant innovation on the part of the firm. Internationally competitive firms 
create a virtuous cycle in which reinvestment drives further growth through innovation and learning. 
Mass production strategies are abandoned to less-developed countries. The most appropriate national 
innovation strategy is one that encourages firms to compete at the high end of the market through 
innovation, product differentiation, and service delivery, in contrast to sole reliance on traditional 
I The issues on the competitiveness agenda range from human resources, science, finance, and 
policy processes, to cultural values and rules of international trade. Forty-five recent reports and 
studies are described in Prosperity (1992); also useful is SCC (1992a). 
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cost-cutting, productivity-enhancing measures.1 
Porter's thesis is that national competitive advantage is embedded in a "competitive diamond" of four 
essential attributes. These are: Factor conditions (labor, land, natural resources, infrastructure, labor 
skills, and services to industry); Demand conditions (the quality and strength of home-market demand 
for local industrial output. Porter attaches considerable importance to the presence of knowledgeable, 
demanding local customers); Related and supporting industries, especially the presence or absence of 
internationally competitive suppliers; and Firm strategy, structure and rivalry, which constitute the 
conditions in which companies are created, organized, and managed. 
Porter says that firms have a "home base" where the key strategic decisions are taken and where the 
core product and process technologies are maintained. He says that if firms do not use their national 
"home base" in this way, they do not contribute to competitiveness of the national economy. 
Porter's Canadian report, ominously entitled Canada at the Crossroads, argues that Canada is not 
doing so well in the new competitive environment (Porter, 1991). Five trends indicate underlying 
weaknesses: low productivity growth, high unit labor costs, persistently high unemployment, lagging 
investment in skills and technology upgrading, and an unencouraging macroeconomic climate for 
productive investments. 
Porter observes that Canada is deficient in vigorous export industries. Most Canadian exports are in 
natural resources industries (materials and metals, forest products, and petroleum and chemicals), 
with some other successful exporters in transportation (mainly automobiles and avionics) and food 
and beverage industries (Porter, 1991). In other words, Canada is specialized in exports of 
unprocessed or semi-processed commodities. Many of the sales of the relatively higher value-added 
exporters, such as chemicals or autoparts, go to a very small number of parent firms in the United 
States. Porter concludes that in Canada, natural resource factor advantages are more important than 
innovation-related "created advantages," and that an abundance of natural resource-related factors 
does not necessarily lead to new factor creation, it leads to specialized resource firms. One might 
1 Porter proposes a four-stage model of national competitiveness development in which capacity to 
construct advantage grows progressively greater: 1. Factor drivgn countries draw most of their 
comparative advantage from basic factors of production. 2. Investment driven countries compete on the 
basis of standardized products on the basis of foreign technology that has been acquired and adapted. 
3. Innovation driven countries appropriate and improve foreign technologies and also create their own. 
At this stage local clusters of industries become "wider" and "deeper." 4. In wealth-driven countries 
substantial outward financial investments lead to a loss of domestic clusters and' loss of market share. 
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expect an indigenous capital goods industry to service the resource industries, but this has not 
happened in Canada. 
Furthermore, Canadian domestic demand plays a minor role in the development of internationally 
competitive Canadian firms; the American market and American suppliers predominate. Domestic 
rivalry is usually not significant in internationally competitive Canadian industries, nor do these 
industries develop local clusters of upstream and downstream linkages. Canadian regional 
development policies prevent geographical concentration of firms, and foreign direct investment in 
Canada has reduced the importance of supporting industries through intrafirm transactions or vertical 
integration. Moreover, Porter notes that few non-North American firms have developed a "home 
base" type relationship with Canada. Porter irked defenders of continental economic integration when 
he suggested that high levels of foreign direct investment in Canada are an impediment to international 
competitiveness. Canada has one of the highest levels of foreign ownership of industrial assets of 
any advanced country, raising the question of the extent to which foreign ownership inhibits the 
development of a national innovation system and, indeed, whether a national innovation system is 
necessarily preferred to integration into an international system" (McFetridge 1993: 320). 
Porter's analysis provoked a debate about the appropriateness for small countries of the "national 
diamond" competitiveness framework. Canada's home country diamond "does not have the answers 
to explain Canada's international competitiveness," say D'Cruz and Rugman (1992), who are 
concerned with the strategic behavior of MNCs operating from small, open economies. To be 
applicable to Canada, the Porter model needs to be corrected for the nature of foreign direct 
investment in Canada, the value added in Canada's resource industries, and the relevance of Canada's 
home country diamond in an integrated North American economic system" (ibid.). In a stream of 
publications, Rugman and D'Cruz have put forward a series of critiques of the Porter model in 
particular and of the more generally held belief in Canada that policies to promote indigenous 
manufacturing or high technology firms firms are critically important. 
D'Cruz's and Rugman's analysis of Canadian competitive advantage is based on the recognition that 
most Canadian firms are concentrated in sectors or production phases in which cost reduction is the 
primary competitive strategy. Canada's ten leading export industries are automobiles, pulp and paper, 
vehicle components, commercial vehicles, non-edible agricultural products, non-ferrous metals, crude 
oil, cereal products, natural gas, and motors, turbines, and pumps. With the exception of the 
automotive sector, Canadian export performance is not determined by an ability on the part of its 
manufacturing sector to compete in international markets. It depends instead upon the output of the 
natural resource sectors" (D'Cruz and Rugman 1992: 21). Also, Rugman and D'Cruz take issue with 
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Porter's selection of strategic industrial clusters. In Fast Forward: Improving Canada's International 
Competitiveness (1991), they identify ten subregional clusters accounting for the bulk of Canadian 
GDP and note that seven of the ten clusters are in the resource sector or in wage-sensitive production 
phases of manufacturing. 1 They view competitiveness in these industries as largely determined by 
productivity growth, which in turn is driven by factor costs, especially wage and capital costs. In 
other words, indigenous advanced-technology development is not regarded as important in these 
sectors' competitiveness. 
The problem of staples-driven economic development is the central theme of Canadian economic 
history. Trade in primary products is a very slowly growing segment of world trade. This is partly 
because barriers to entry are relatively low, encouraging exports from the Third World and soon from 
the former Soviet Union. Of equal concern is the phenomenon of "dematerialization" of production, 
in which information-rich, highly engineered components such as optical fibers, ceramics, or high- 
strength composites replace simple commodity-based components.2 Because of competition ands 
dematerialization of production, the long-term trend for commodity prices is down. In 1992 the 
Economist "reported that real commodity prices were at their lowest level since the magazine began 
calculating an all-item index in 1845" (Pestieau 1993: 2). Canada has specialized its international 
trade in a small range of slow-growth commodities concentrated in the North American market. 
Canadian resource firms typically develop firm-specific process innovations which provide 
advantage. They maintain technical currency through procurement of foreign machinery, licenses, 
patents, and foreign producers, and when they do undertake R&D it is frequently abroad. Thanks to 
their cultural or geographic proximity to American and British technology markets, Canadian 
multinationals are probably among the fast 'technology followers"' (Niosi 1983, 189). However, 
compared to their competitors in other countries, Canadian firms distinguish themselves by choosing 
to compete more on the basis of cost than on the basis of innovation. For example, a recent study of 
innovation strategies in the Canadian non-ferrous metals sector found that R&D spending had 
declined in the 1980s, remaining at less than one percent of sales, while R&D spending in comparable 
Japanese and European firms had doubled to more than two percent of sales (SCC 1992b). This 
behavior reflects deliberate strategy, not just costs of production. According to Japanese and Finnish 
1 The clusters are Western forest products, Alberta energy, Prairie farming, metal mining, Ontario 
automotive, Ontario manufacturing, Toronto financial, Eastern forest products, Montreal aerospatial, and 
Atlantic seafood. 
2 On dematerialization see Ardekani (1990) . 
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managers of mining companies quoted in the study, conventional business operations generating half 
or more of total revenues received only a small fraction of the R&D budget, while research on higher 
value-added activities - new materials and new products - received up to ninety percent of the R&D 
budget. 1 
A second key shortcoming of the Porter model when applied to small, open economies, according to 
Rugman and D'Cruz (1993), is that one cannot measure the international competitiveness of smaller 
countries in terms of export shares because "much of the business of smaller countries is conducted 
abroad (through foreign direct investment) within the larger triad markets of the United States, E.C. 
and Japan - where the action is." Porter does not count overseas sales by the subsidiaries of 
Canadian-owned multinationals in export share data, giving the impression of poor Canadian export 
performance. Dunning (1993) points out that there are three kinds of cross-border commercial 
interactions: arm's length trade, inter-firm cooperative agreements, and foreign direct investment. He 
argues that Porter has substantially underestimated the importance of globalized production, especially 
the cross-border value added activities of transnational firms, much of which takes place as intrafirm 
trade. 
Canada is an important exporter of capital. Canadians invest abroad almost as much per capita as 
Americans. Between 1987 and 1991 about $5.4 billion was invested in the country annually, while 
about $6.6 billion was invested outside the country annually. In 1990 the foreign direct investment 
stock in Canada stood at $125.3 billion and the Canadian direct investment stock abroad stood at 
$86.7 billion (U.N. 1993). In 1990 Canada had some 1300 indigenous MNCs. Even the resource 
industries are footloose. Between 1980 and 1990, incoming foreign direct investment stock in the 
primary sector in Canada increased only slightly from $4.6 billion to $5 billion, while Canadian 
outward direct investments in the primary sector increased from $2.7 billion to $5.7 billion. 
The largest increases in outward FDI in the past decade are not in the primary sector however, but in 
low value-added segments of the secondary sector and in parts of the tertiary sector. In the former, 
the Canadian outward FDI stock increased from $17.3 to $46 billion between 1980 and 1990, with 
huge increases in FDI stock in food and beverages ($2.3 to $5.8 billion), paper ($2 to $10.5 billion), 
1 Similar trends were found in other sectors in Canada. The Canadian pulp and paper industry spent 
about four times less on R&D than its major American and European competitors. In the forest 
products industry, which is the largest source of Canada's trade surplus, relative levels of R&D spending 
were about half that of major competitors. Only two forest product firms conducted in-house R&D on 
solid wood products. Industrial R&D staffing fell from six hundred in 1980 to five hundred in 1990 
(SCC 1992c). 
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coal and petroleum products ($.9 to $6.5 billion), metals ($5.5 to $14.2 billion), and other 
manufacturing ($.9 to $3 billion). Canadian outward FDI in the tertiary sector increased from $7 to 
$34.9 billion, with the largest increase in the financial and insurance industries ($3.7 billion to $24.7 
billion between 1980 and 1990). In 1990 Canada had $86.7 billion of FDI outside the country, of 
which 61% was in the U.S., 21% in Western Europe, and 13% in developing areas (United Nations 
1993). 
Porter's model raises questions about how two-way FDI contributes to a "small" country's 
competitive advantage. This is a critical issue for "small" countries. In the past, incoming FDI has 
been considered much more significant than outward FDI in discussions of Canadian economic 
competitiveness. This is especially true in the context of understanding the accumulation of 
technological capability. A long debate within Canada has considered the pros and cons of incoming 
FDI and, in particular, its effects on domestic innovatory capability. Porter believes that outward FDI 
is valuable in creating competitive advantage, but that foreign subsidies are not sources of competitive 
advantage and that inward FDI is not entirely healthy" (as cited in D'Cruz and Rugman 1993). 
The opportunity to centralize operations and rationalize production in a regional market is especially 
attractive to manufacturing MNCs in mature or price-sensitive industries which are among the 
leading proponents of the strategy to narrow product mix and expand production runs" (Litvak 1990, 
118). However, a closer look at the often conflicting set of pressures toward globalization and 
localization shows that the strategic consequences of these pressures are not identical across 
industries. Some firms develop multinational or global, highly rationalized structures, and others 
develop transnational structures or purely local structures (Crookell 1990; Eden 1991). Multinational 
firms respond to changes in terms of ownership advantages, internalization advantages, and locational 
advantages; new information-based manufacturing technologies and trade policy changes also 
influence locational decisions (Eden 1991). 
Because of these factors and the importance of the U.S. market, the Canadian "diamond" is not 
necessarily of primary significance to Canadian firms. They also must take into account the U.S. 
"diamond" and for this reason small trade-dependent countries like Canada, Denmark, and New 
Zealand must look at their competitive advantages in terms of the domestic "diamonds" of their 
principal markets. This requires a "double diamond" strategy (Rugman and D'Cruz 1993). 
I have described at some length one of the debates on Canadian competitiveness to illustrate some of 
the ways that transnationalized production within the continental economy complicates the analysis of 
competitiveness. Integration into a larger system of innovation raises questions of how to make the 
best of proximity to this larger system. 
17 
4. "Green" Industrial Innovation 
Although alarms about global environmental degradation have been sounded for the past three 
decades, the environmental situation today is different in four new ways (Rath and Herbert-Copley 
1993: 7): 
* rapid increase in the scale of pollution has accelerated loss of soil, species, clean water, and natural 
environments. 
* tens of thousands of synthetic chemicals, most of which are untested as to toxic or environmental 
effects, are replacing natural pollutants. 
* the transboundary impacts of environmentally disturbing human activities require international or 
transnational remedies that can be long and complex to put in place. 
* because the various environmental threats are inextricably linked, both in their causes and effects," 
they cannot be addressed or solved in isolation one from the others. 
There is growing acceptance of the "precautionary principle" and the clean production paradigm in 
environmental management. The precautionary principle, which was endorsed by the Earth Summit 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, discourages attempts to establish environmental management strategies 
based on calculation of the pollution carrying capacity of the environment, with innovation aimed at 
waste management and production of end-of-pipe pollution abatement techniques. Instead, the 
precautionary principle advocates reduction to zero of all emissions of substances that are "persistent, 
toxic and liable to bioaccumulate...even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link 
between emissions and actions" (Jackson 1991: 8). 
The clean production paradigm advocates approaches such as product lifecycle assessment and 
closed-cyle industrial ecological desit::_ to foster across-the-board prevention of pollution in industrial 
systems (Dethlefsen, Jackson, and Taylor, 1993; Hirschhorn, Jackson, and Baas, 1993). The 
principles of "clean production" are precaution (i.e. reduction of anthropogenic inputs into the 
environment), prevention (i.e. extend the analysis of environmental implications of production as far 
upstream as possible), and integration of environmental protection measures across system 
boundaries (i.e. integration of protection measures into the production process) (Jackson 1993b). 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines pollution prevention as "source reduction" that 
eliminates or reduces pollutants through improvements in equipment, technology, processes or 
procedures, redesign or reformulation of products, substitution of raw materials, and "improvements 
in housekeeping, maintenance, training and inventory control." Recycling,. re-use, and end-of-pipe 
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pollution control are excluded. The Technology Innovation and Economics Committee of the U.S. 
National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology advocates a hierarchy of 
technological approaches to environmental improvement: in order of desirability, these are: 
technologies that prevent pollution (including waste minimization and source reduction technologies), 
recycling technologies, environmental control [i.e. end- of-pipe] technologies, and cleanup [i.e. 
remedial] technologies" (EPA 1991). 
Distinctions between minor and major forms of technological innovation suggest ways of 
distinguishing between tactical and strategic approaches to technological change. Tactical 
interventions aim to accelerate the incremental improvement of the environmental efficiency of existing 
industry by reducing wastage and increasing recycling. They would put in place policy and economic 
incentives and disincentives, management paradigms, and investment and training strategies to 
produce many small improvements on a broad front. Strategic interventions would aim to innovate 
substantially improved technologies, radically improved technological systems, or* new 
technoeconomic paradigms. 
The distinction between innovation of minor and major magnitude is being taken up by national and 
international policy and program agencies. For example, the OECD advocates a three-pronged 
transition to the "fourth industrial revolution," the clean industrial production revolution comparable to 
the steam, steel-electricity, and electronics revolutions. 
* The first thrust is to induce incremental improvements in industrial performance by acting to 
identify, deploy and implement existing cleaner technologies through provision of information, 
removal of barriers to trade and implementation, government purchasing programs, and so on. 
* The second thrust is to accelerate technical and technological change by acting to promote innovative 
development and widespread implementation of new generations of cleaner technologies, through 
enunciation of coherent goals and policies such as Japan's New Earth 21 Plan or the Netherlands' 
National Environment Policy Plan Plus, which sets long term environmental quality goals; 
* The third thrust is to sustain environmentally sound industrial innovation by acting to ensure that 
cleaner technologies become and remain the basis for economic development in the long term through 
education and collective action, innovation of cleaner technologies, etc, (OECD 1993, ix-x). 
The conjunction of innovation policy and environmental policy is relatively recent. Environmental 
sustainability has not been a major consideration among mainstream innovation policy and 
management researchers. Winn and Roome (1993) recently searched the core R&D management 
literature of the past two decades for work on environmental issues, and identified only nine articles. 
Clarke and Reavely's (1993) 10,000-item bibliography of core science and technology management 
literature contains references to only 31 documents that focus explicitly on environmental issues. 
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Similarly, the literature on "green" innovation policies is relatively small and dispersed among the 
literatures on environmental management, environmental economics, risk assessment, and economics 
of innovation. 
As in any policy area, one wishes to know what the policy objectives are and what they should be, 
which instruments are deployed and why, and what are their effects, including costs and benefits; one 
also wishes to understand the policymaking process. Key environmental policy instruments for 
industry are regulations, technical assistance to firms, economic instruments such as tax and liability 
arrangements, consensus-building processes such as roundtables, and international agreements.) A 
comprehensive pollution prevention environmental policy regime should include 1) technical 
assistance programs; 2) education and training; 3) financial incentives; 4) increased use of liability 
regulations; and 5) "regulations specifically requiring the development of waste reduction plans and 
the submission to governments of regular reports on their progress in waste reduction" (Baas et al. 
1992: 14; Yakowitz and Hammer, 1993). 
Regulation is the most widespread mechanism of public control of industrial environmental 
performance. Most research on the effects of environmental, health, and safety regulation is designed 
to determine its effects on productivity and profitability. In a review of this research, the Office of 
Technology Assessment (1994) concludes that environmental regulation was responsible for 10 to 15 
percent of the productivity slowdown in the U.S. in the 1970s, but that "other factors (such as 
technology changes, investment, and training) were more important" (p. 325). 
Of growing interest is research on the effects of environmental regulation and standards on the rate 
and direction of innovation for the improvement of the design of regulations and standards. 
Promotion of acquisition of environmentally improved industrial technology is becoming an important 
environmental policy goal. The structure of incentives and disincentives to invest in minor or major 
forms of industrial innovation having some relation with environmental sustainability is clearly of 
central importance. The design of environmental policy from an innovation policy perspective must 
ensure that counterproductive policy measures from other domains, such as subsidies for energy, 
water, or local raw materials, are detected and dealt with.2 
1 Ashford (1993). A more comprehensive taxonomy of innovation policy measures which might be 
applied to environtally sustainable industrial innovation is provided by Rothwell and Zegvold (1985). 
2 On proposed environmental tax reform in Canada see Gillies (1994). 
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The traditional approach to control of industrial pollution is through implementation of end-of-pipe 
(EOP) technologies, the main effect of which is to displace the pollution charge from one medium to 
another. Concomitant with this approach to environmental industrial technology policy are regulatory 
regimes based on concepts of environmental assimilative capacity or critical pollution loads. I 
Historically, "technology diffusion has played a limited and subordinate role to regulation, permitting, 
and compliance in the regulation-based environmental management system" (EPA 1992: 15). This is 
because the regulation-based environmental policy systems of the 1970s encouraged investments in 
pollution control technologies rather than in environmental improvement of processes, products, 
housekeeping, and materials handling. Permitting and compliance regulatory frameworks created a 
demand for add-on pollution abatement techniques, a demand reflected in national S&T policies. In 
the former West Germany, for example, governmental support for R&D on clean technologies 
focussed largely on invention of end-of- pipe pollution abatement techniques (Bongaerts and 
Heinrichs 1987). Once investments have been made in end-of-pipe pollution control technologies, 
there is little incentive to adopt the more comprehensive pollution prevention management paradigm. 
Furthermore, suppliers of pollution control solutions may resist movement toward a precautionary 
policy regime: "experience in the U.S. has shown this to be a significant issue, because the end-of- 
pipe approach has advocates and a large industry selling, the hardware of pollution control (e.g. 
scrubbers, incinerators, waste treatment plants)" (Hirschhorn:1992: 11). 
Regulations "must be explicitly designed with technological considerations in mind - that is, they 
should be fashioned to elicit the type of technological response desired" (Ashford 1993: 296). The 
regulatory design "should combine an assessment of the innovative capacity of the possible 
responding industrial sectors with levels and forms of regulation tailored to that capacity. The entire 
process should reflect a realistic evaluation of the best possible achievable technological goal" (ibid. p. 
289). The EPA's National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology emphasizes 
that disincentives to technological innovation and adoption environmentally improved technologies 
must be removed from regulatory permitting and enforcement (EPA 1992, 1991). 
Technical assistance to firms for improvement of environmental performance is another public policy 
instrument which has led to recent institutional innovation in Canada and the United States. Technical 
assistance institutions can be classified on a four-point scale of increasing involvement in a firm's 
decision-making (Doyle 1992). At level one, the technical assistance institution provides information 
and networking services. There are many public and private environmental technology databases and 
1 On attempts to found environmental management regimes on scientific understanding of the behavior 
of various pollutants in the environment see Chadwick and Nilsson (1993). 
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referral services available, including ICPIC, the International Cleaner Production Information 
Clearinghouse. At Level Two, in addition to providing information the technical assistance institution 
brokers specialized services such as business planning, market assessment, and identification of 
financial sources. Many Chambers of Commerce and Business Innovation Centers operate at this 
level. At Level Three, the technical assistance institution provides technical and financial 
infrastructure support, including (for example) operation of incubators, prototyping services, 
technical services, and arm's-length financial assistance. This is a hands-on technical assistance role 
that requires proactive behavior on the part of the institution. An example of a Level Three institution 
in the United States is NETAC, the National Environmental Technology Applications Corporation. 
NETAC provides business evaluations, technology evaluations, regulatory and intellectual property 
assistance, training, and technical services such as testing and demonstration. It also has a product 
evaluation center specialized in bioremediation technologies. , At Level Four, the institution 
participates directly in the firm through equity investments and close technical and management ties. 
An example is the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (SITRA), an independent 
public fund of about US$ 100M with the mission to take research to market. It supports new 
ventures through minority equity participation (Doyle 1992). 
Overall, an important lesson from the United States is that cleaner production outreach programmes 
can take many different forms. There is considerable variation in the pollution prevention 
programmes managed by the 50 states. The programmes are located in a variety of institutions and 
provide a diverse array of services" (UNIDO/UNEP 1992: 7). 
Deliberate transition to cleaner production at the firm level can begin with a waste audit, the "first step 
in an on-going programme designed to achieve maximum resource optimisation and improved process 
performance. It is a common sense approach to problem identification and problem solving" 
(UNEP/UNIDO 1991b). The waste auditing procedure advocated by the.United Nations agencies: 
* defines sources, quantities and types of wastes being generated; 
* collates information on unit operations, raw materials, products, water usage and wastes; 
* highlights process inefficiencies and areas of poor management; 
* helps set targets for waste reduction; 
* permits the development of cost-effective waste management strategies; 
* raises awareness in the workforce regarding the benefits of waste reduction; 
* increases management's knowledge of these processes; 
* helps to improve process efficiency (UNEP/UNIDO 1991b: 3-4). 
The result of a waste audit is the development and implementation of an action plan to reduce waste 
, 
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and improve production efficiency which, if implemented, can provide significant economic benefits 
to the firm, as indicated by the findings of the Dutch PRISMA program, one of the programmatic 
models for UNEP/UNIDO cleaner production programs. The PRISMA waste auditing procedure 
identified about 200 hundred pollution prevention options among a group of corporate participants. 
Only 30% of these options implied technological modifications; 30% implied improvement in 
housekeeping procedures, 30% implied changes in materials and raw materials, and 10% implied 
product modifications (Huisingh and Baas 1991: 28; see also Dieleman and de Hoo, 1993). 
Taken together, housekeeping procedures, material inputs, production technologies, and product 
parameters constitute "industrial practice." Significant benefits can be gained from incremental 
improvements in existing industrial practice, especially in relatively backward subregions of North 
America where the stock of equipment and the skill sets of workers and management are all likely to 
be farther from good practice than in technologically dynamic subregions. 
The precautionary principal and the clean production paradigm hint that they can move toward major 
changes of technology systems through many incremental improvements in production and 
transformation of management philosophy. Also of interests the development of new R&D-based 
production systems in which ecoefficiency is a critical design parameter. The capacity to create 
technologies has never been greater in industrialized countries. The world is currently on the brink of 
a new technoeconomic paradigm based upon information and image technologies, biotechnology, 
new materials, and a range of improved energy technologies. The technical characteristics of radically 
different technologies for long term environmental sustainability are still largely speculative, and the 
environmental implications of various configurations of the emerging technoeconomic paradigm are 
only beginning to be explored (OECD 1991; Freeman 1992). 
It is not so simple to identify kinds of "clean" or environmentally sound technologies the promotion 
and diffusion of which are to be encouraged. Since no currently known technologies are perfectly 
clean or entirely environmentally sound, cleanliness or environmental soundness are relative. The key 
characteristic of cleaner technologies is that they are cleaner than prior technologies with respect to 
materials flow, energy efficiency, or toxicity. Cleaner technologies: 
* extract and utilize natural resources and prepare products as efficiently as possible; 
* use as little energy and raw materials as possible per unit of product output and per unit of utilization 
(useful lifetime) of the product; 
* generate products with reduced or no potentially harmful components; 
* minimize releases to air, water, and soil during fabrication and use of product; 
* ensure that any residua, of production and use which are generated are managed in an 
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environmentally sound manner; 
* ensure, for non-perishable goods, that product durability and lifetimes are maximized insofar as 
practicable; and, after the useful function is ended, products or their key components are recoverable 
insofar as possible (OECD 1993: 2). 
These characteristics can apply to many techniques and practices across the entire range of industries. 
As a World Resources Institute report observes, "today the climate for innovation seems uniquely 
rich, poised between technological revolutions in progress and others just emerging" (Heaton, 
Repetto, and Sobin 1991: 7). A huge reservoir of untapped technological potential in biotechnology, 
materials, and informatics exists which could increase energy efficiency and reduce waste production. 
A World Resources Institute report proposes environmentally critical technologies for the United 
Statesl and proposes environmental technology policy initiatives which include a federal Institute for 
Environmental Technology, new funding arrangements to support environmental technological 
innovation, new missions for national laboratories, new patterns of R&D cooperation, new 
arrangements for international cooperation, regulatory reform, and reorientation of existing programs 
(Heaton, Repetto, and Sobin, 1992). 
Most industrialized countries have taken measures to stimulate innovation of new generations of 
environmentally sound technologies. The Japanese are probably the most ambitious in this respect. 
Their New Earth 21" plan aims develop a new industrial paradigm to restore the Earth's natural 
functions over the next century by returning the emission of global warming gases to pre-industrial 
revolution levels. They have established RITE, the Research Institute of Innovative Technology for 
the Earth, for development and global promotion of next generation environmental technologies. 
RITE is applying advanced technologies to problems of renewable energy, energy efficiency, new 
manufacturing processes, and capture and fixation of carbon dioxide. Germany, the Netherlands, 
Italy, and Canada are other industrialized countries which have established national initiatives to 
support development of strategic environmental technologies. 
A number of recent authors incorporate the precautionary principal into frameworks for action. 
Simonis (1989), for example, identifies three strategic elements of environmental modernization of 
1 These are: energy capture (photovoltaics, geothermal, solar thermal electricity, nuclear fission); energy 
storage and application (batteries, superconductors, hydrogen storage, heat storage, fuel cells); special 
energy end-uses (transportation, buildings); agricultural biotechnology; improved agricultural 
techniques; manufacturing monitoring, modeling, and control; catalysis; separations; precision 
fabricatyion; materials design and processing; information, communications, and computing; and 
contraception. . 
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industrial society: ecological structural economic change (notably actions to delink growth from 
environmentally relevant input factors); preventive environmental policy; and ecological orientation of 
environmental policy. Robins and Trisoglio (1992) propose ten priorities for an eco-industrial policy: 
establish a strategic vision, manage structural change, shift to circular industrial ecosystems, design 
products for needs, build human capacity, ensure corporate accountabilty, use market mechanisms for 
industrial transformation, guide technological development, foster sustainable livelihoods, and build 
global partnerships. 
Corporations in the 2 1 st century will find it essential to be able to innovate and operate competitively 
while operating in an environmentally responsible manner. Shifts in thinking about the strategic 
importance of ecoefficiency are already apparent among businesses (Davis and Smith, 1994). In one 
recent survey of 200 senior executives in the US, 90% said that environmental considerations were 
part of their strategic planning process. In another survey of 250 European companies, almost three 
quarters were found to have specific plans to improve environmental performance. A 1991 report, 
from the Canadian Federation of Independent Business states that 99% of their members are 
concerned about the state of the natural environment, and that 60% have made, or are about to make, 
significant changes to their businesses to respond to environmental concerns. The Canadian 
Standards Association has been working to develop environmental management systems analogous to 
the ISO 9000 series of Quality Management Standards. 
5. Conclusion 
The sustainability and competitiveness agendas are addressed by specialized actors in policy 
networks, lobbies, researchers, government agencies, and some non-governmental not-for-profit 
institutions. Ultimately, attainment of the twin goals of environmental sustainability and economic 
competitiveness may well require a much deepened understanding of these complex issues among the 
public. This is partly because movement toward sustainability and competitiveness requires a 
multitude of behavioral changes among citizens, and partly because the magnitude of necessary 
changes requires well-informed voters in democratic political systems. While most of the discussions 
about sustainability and competitiveness focus on policy and economic incentives, the roles of the 
public - as consumers, as voters, as civic actors - are important as well. The competitiveness agenda 
makes an strong set of demands on social values and business culture. If Canada and the United 
States develop what has been called a "high growth, low employment" economic trajectory, 
successful social adjustment to technological change will require new social and political skills. 
3 
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The sustainability agenda is analogous. North American consumers say they want to preserve the 
environment, but "green" marketing does not always elicit the expected responses, and citizens are 
"wary of the environmental costs they might have to pay as taxpayers, consumers, or workers" 
(MacEvoy, 1992). 
With the exception of markets, mechanisms and instruments of deliberate social choice, especially 
ones that are feasible under regimes of democratic governance, are a relatively unknown part of the 
"selection environment" that might lead to ecoefficient industrial innovation. For example, the notion 
of cleaner production does not rest upon a narrow doctrine of technical efficiency, but on a deeper 
ambition to gauge the social appropriateness of products (see Jackson 1993b). Philosophers of 
industrial metabolism and industrial ecology are attempting to locate principles of extrafirm regulation 
in efficient systems of transactions among firms, while a current of research attempts to locate the 
principles of a strong socially determined "selection environment" in processes of social negotiation of 
technical change.1 
Freeman (1992) points out that the issue of eco-efficient industrial production hinges on estimates of 
the feasibility with which an "accelerated orientation of the science-technology system in the desired 
direction can be brought about." As far as common resources are concerned, "sustainability of the 
system wll depend more on social institutions controlling access than on production technologies" 
(Lynam and Herdt 1989: 396). But we have decreasing degrees of freedom as we move from the 
scientifically conceivable to the technologically feasible, and from there to the economically viable and 
the socially acceptable (Perez 1983). 
In this paper I've tried to contextualize the competitiveness and sustainability issues in terms of the 
North American system of innovation, which is constituted largely of flows of trade, people, 
technology, and investment across North America, bilateral scientific relations between the major 
regional power and the two smaller countries, and trade policy rules embodied in a formal agreement. 
Scientific or technical collaboration at the North American level is quite modest. Undoubtedly the 
nodes of the regional innovation system are in technologically dynamic metropolitan areas. The 
1 See for example Irwin and Vergragt (1989). Radical social innovation for environmental 
sustainability is especially problematic. Massive changes in lifestyles and consumption would require 
social engineering, coercive policies, or extremely rapid social learning on an unprecedented scale. On 
the efforts (largely in Northern countries) to define frameworks for "green" political action see 
Eckersley (1992) and Dobson (1990). On the question of the politics of the social transition to 
sustainability see, for example, Kassiola (1990), especially chapter 9, "Social Transformation into a 
Transindustrial Community." 
26 
contours of the North American innovation system are still indeterminate, depending largely on the 
innovation strategies and behavior of the corporate world and governments in the North American 
economic space. 
For the "smaller" countries of the region, integration into a regional innovation system has particular 
advantages and disadvantages. Two outstanding questions have to do with business strategy in the 
new North American economic space, and the scope, aims, and ambition of innovation policy within 
or pertaining to this space. A number of other issues such as the technological dimensions of regional 
economic security, the special problems of less-developed regions of North America, the regulation of 
competition and monopolies at the regional level, and the promotion of ecoefficient industrial 
innovation remain to be addressed. The ultimate issue is the degree to which ecoefficient industrial 
production is competitive in the North American or global context. 
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